haps say that he was much pleased to see me think so well of him, but that he took on the whole a view of things different from mine. Such an answer would be calculated to make me appear very ridiculous. Now I do not wish to embarrass Mr. Cleveland nor do I wish to appear very ridiculous." Accordingly Schurz directed that, unless Cleveland's approval of what was written should be obtained, the letter should not be read at the approaching meeting. All the difficulties of the situation were removed, however, by authentic reports that were sent to Mr. Schurz of what had passed between Mr. Cleveland and the machine leaders. The candidate had made no pledges; he had wholly dominated the recalcitrant politicians, and had brought them, unhappy and grumbling, to recognize him as their master. Then the letter was sent. It made a great political sensation, not only on account of its strong arguments, especially for a reduction of the tariff, but also because it destroyed those false reports about Cleveland's surrender and discomfited the men that at least found consolation in them. It was widely circulated as a campaign document.

Each number of *Harper's Weekly* throughout the campaign contained a leader by Schurz in which he discussed, with his peculiar lucidity and moral vigor, the different questions of interest to open-minded voters. More than one of these editorials shows that he was as thorough a master

of the tariff question as he was of the currency question; and that he was as far from being a victim of the sophistries of protection as he was of those of " rag-money." But as yet few beyond an intimate circle knew that these articles came from Ms pen.

The great triumph of the Democratic ticket in November gave profound satisfaction to Mr. Schurz. His most eloquent expression of this feeling was in an address at the annual